The United States completely withdrew its troops from Afghanistan recently, becoming the third superpower to be broken in this “Graveyard of Empires” following in the footsteps of Great Britain and the former Soviet Union. The chaotic scenes at the airport in the capital Kabul have occupied the front pages of the news media recently, and have also affected the emotions of audiences everywhere.
Looking back at the past, Afghanistan’s reputation as a “Graveyard of Empires” can be traced back to the Opium War (1839-1842), when Britain actually fought two wars in Asia at the same time. One was the Opium War that had a profound impact on China, and the other was the war in Afghanistan, known as the “First Anglo-Afghan War”. The focus of the British Empire back then was actually the battle for Central Asia with Russia, but unexpectedly, the British Empire’s tens of thousands of armies ultimately lost their helmets and armour in Afghanistan, and withdrew their troops. On the contrary, it was the smaller army that invaded China that had unexpected “success”.
Since it is the hub of Central Asia, Afghanistan has often become a battlefield for great powers, from the early days of the “Great Game” between Britain and Russia, to the Cold War struggles between the Soviet Union and the United States. This time the US has evacuated in embarrassment. People have compared the situation with the hasty evacuation of Saigon in 1975 with photos of the helicopter evacuating people from the top floor of the embassy back then. The two historic scenes are indeed surprisingly similar. However if we think about the terrible loss of British soldiers in the First Anglo-Afghan War and the ending of the Soviet Union’s clash with the mujahideen in the late 1980’s, the current ending of the US occupation is probably worth celebrating by the Americans.
Where did the Americans fail? If this question has to be asked, we will actually fall into another historical loop: where did the Soviets fail? Where did the British fail? The answers to these questions probably appeared in the first British invasion of Afghanistan. Regarding this war, I recommend the British historian William Dalrymple’s Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan 1839-42, a classic with comprehensive and detailed reviews of the conflict. According to the analysis in the book, if the British and Indian Governors of Auckland and London were willing to listen to the strategy of the Scottish intelligence officer and "China School” scholar Alexander Burnes, the United Kingdom would have had the opportunity to achieve its strategic goal through diplomatic channels: win over Dost Muhammad, the most powerful local, to join the “pro-British” camp, which could have driven Russian forces out of the area without having to launch military operations that cost money and human lives, thus they might have been able to avoid falling into a dilemma. It is worth mentioning that it was Dost Muhammad who became famous after driving out the British and becoming a “national hero” of Afghanistan, the “father of the nation” and “religious leader” admired by generations of Afghans. Among them is Omar Mullah, founder of the Taliban, who claims to follow him.
The reasons why the British finally failed in Afghanistan were of course multifaceted. Among them were the arrogance of the empire, the incompetence of its commanders, and the disregard for local religious traditions, complex tribal factions, and the will of the people. However, the biggest failure should be summarised. These outsiders only consider their own national interests and wishfully supported agents to come to power, while those who were placed in power quickly became arrogant, corrupt and profligated in everything, especially not making the people’s interests their priority. This is no wonder, because the source of their power was not the Afghan people, nor their own military or political strength, but the foreign army they relied on. In his book, William Dalrymple also links the Anglo-Arab war with the US-Arab war that was still going on at the time, and the personal experience in Afghanistan he describes at the end of the book actually foreshadows the unbearable ending we seeing today, as early as ten years ago.
